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The Battle of Bushy Run

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The Battle of BUSHY RUN



Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission
Harrisburg, 1966

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The painting reproduced on the cover, "The Black Watch at Bushy Run, 1763," by C. W. Jefferys, depicts the defeat of the Indians by Colonel Henry Bouquet's troops on August 6. Note the flour bag fortification (left) erected by the troops. The painting is from the Imperial Oil Collection.



Courtesy Mellon Institute

"The Road to Pittsburgh," by Nicholas Eggenhofer

The Battle of
BUSHY RUN

By
Niles Anderson

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission
Harrisburg, 1966

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The Battle of Bushy Run

BY 1763, the Indian tribes contained behind the western frontier of British-American exploration and settlement realized, belatedly, that they must band together to stop the alarming encroachment of settlers. In early May, 1763, the gifted chief of the Ottawa nation, Pontiac, united warriors of the Ottawas, Wyandots, Chippewas, and Potawatomes for an assault on Detroit. Failing to take the fort by trickery, he settled down to a siege that was not lifted until the end of October.

Inspired by Pontiac's example, his cohorts enlarged the horizon of battle to capture and in most instances kill the small garrisons of satellite forts about Detroit. The uprising spread through the forests to threaten the Pennsylvania posts of Venango (Franklin), Le Boeuf (Waterford), and Presque Isle (Erie), and finally to reach Fort Pitt, Fort Bedford, and Fort Ligonier.

FIRST SIGNS OF A THREAT

At the beginning of 1763 all was quiet at the stronghold of Fort Pitt, even though the guards had been alerted to renewed evidence of Indian unrest. Captain Simeon Ecuyer, the commander, had spent most of the early spring repairing damage from a flood, heeding, thereby, the admonition of General Jeffery Amherst, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America, that he concentrate only on measures absolutely necessary for preserving the garrison and stores.

In late May Indian threats were turned into action. On May 27 Captain Ecuyer learned that the Delawares and Mingoes had abandoned their nearby towns and cornfields and had been trading skins for powder and lead. The next day a war party from the Delaware tribe raided a nearby plantation, killed two men, two women, and a child, and burned the building at the settlement.

The 30th brought more bad news. Fourteen traders, en route to Fort Pitt from the Delaware town of Tuscarawas, had been ambushed at Beaver River, with only three escaping. These three carried the information that the Lake Indians had brought the war belt to the Delawares, that Detroit was under attack, and that Sandusky had been burned.

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mrs. Gail M. Gibson, Assistant Historian, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, in preparing the manuscript for this booklet.

Ecuyer could no longer doubt that a state of war existed. He sent a letter to Colonel Henry Bouquet, the commanding officer of the Southern Department (Pennsylvania and provinces south), at Philadelphia, who in turn forwarded the news to General Amherst in New York. Ecuyer noted that the Indians had massacred two of his men at the sawmill, had taken both scalps, and had left a war club or tomahawk to signify war.

There was other evidence to heighten the fear of war. Two official messengers sent to warn the northern posts of Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango were turned back almost within sight of Fort Pitt. Messengers sent to the east were, in the meantime, more successful, and the garrisons at Fort Bedford and Fort Ligonier were alerted.

DEFENSES ARE STRENGTHENED

On May 31 Captain Lewis Ourry at Bedford had command of a force consisting of a corporal and six men. In town were thirty-six men able to bear arms, who were quickly organized into a militia. This defending force was increased to two companies totalling 155 men as nearby settlers flocked to the fort for protection.

The regular garrison at Fort Ligonier, under the command of Lieutenant Archibald Blane, also consisted of only seven men at the start of Indian hostilities. By June 3, however, Blane had a force of forty, organized from townsfolk and refugees, pack horse drivers, and militia (a captain and eighteen men) borrowed from Fort Bedford. Inhabitants between the way stations of Bushy Run on the west and Stony Creek on the east sought sanctuary at the fort.

Captains Ecuyer and Ourry and Lieutenant Blane took similar measures to increase their defenses. At Fort Pitt a militia force organized from the townspeople raised the number of defenders to 250, double the size of the original garrison. The townspeople and others from outlying settlements were moved into the fort, and the buildings outside it were burned so as not to give cover to lurking Indians. There were altogether about 550 people crowded into the fort. Food was strictly rationed as the refugees strained the dwindling supplies.

INDIANS ATTACK THE FORT

During the month of June, encounters at Fort Pitt were more a harassment than a siege. Working parties cutting wheat and their

covering parties were fired upon; random shots directed at the fort kept sentinels alert. Distant smoke told of the burning of outlying homes. Indians were seen at the upper end of the garden and on both sides of the river. But casualties were few as Ecuyer refused to be decoyed into sending parties beyond the protection of the guns of the fort.

Apparently, few Indians dared approach the strong defenses at Fort Bedford; there is no record of attack, although isolated farms in the vicinity did suffer. Fort Ligonier, the weaker and more exposed of the two eastern forts, suffered two attacks and was under constant threat of further assault. The first attack came on June 2; Lieutenant Blane reported in a letter to Colonel Bouquet that a group of Indians had fired upon the fort at about five in the morning. Since they came no closer than the edge of the woods, Blane wasted no ammunition on them.

The second attack, more vigorous than the first, was made at Fort Ligonier on June 21. A fifteen-man foray party which had gone out to capture a decoy of four Indians was caught in an ambush by an estimated 100 Indians. Fortunately, a swamp between the Indians and the soldiers permitted the latter to return safely to the fort.

Communication, though irregular, remained open from Fort Pitt to the east until late in June. It had been blocked to the north since early in the month, although reports of the steadily worsening situation arrived occasionally.

On June 25 two of the thirteen-man garrison at Fort Le Boeuf stumbled in to report the worst: Le Boeuf had been attacked and burned by the Senecas on the 18th. Fort Venango had suffered the same fate, with apparently no survivors among the sixteen-man garrison stationed there.

The next day six more of the complement from Le Boeuf arrived. A soldier from Presque Isle brought the final news of catastrophe; after a two-day fight on the 19th and 20th, the garrison at Presque Isle had capitulated to an estimated force of 250 Indian attackers.

Ecuyer sent these reports on to Bouquet shortly before the Indians closed the communication route late in June. Thereafter, Ligonier and Bedford kept up a communication with the east, but heard nothing more from Fort Pitt.



Colonel Henry Bouquet

BOUQUET SEEKS ASSISTANCE

Throughout the month of June, as reports of the desperate situation of forts and settlers on the frontier became more alarming, the British military command attempted to give what relief it could.

Upon receiving Ecuyer's report as forwarded by Colonel Bouquet, General Amherst on June 6 ordered the available reserves of the light infantry companies of two Highland regiments, the Forty-second and the Seventy-seventh, to assemble on Staten Island. He still doubted that the Indian warfare was general, however. Six days later (June 12) he was convinced of the general nature of the warfare, but he remained doubtful of the rumors concerning Detroit. Nonetheless, he sent Bouquet two light infantry companies, which, upon their arrival in Philadelphia, were routed to Carlisle.

As late as the middle of June, Bouquet was in doubt as to his course of action. He wrote Amherst of his proposal to lead a relief expedition to Fort Pitt, if the situation there was as bad as it was represented. Before the end of the month Bouquet's plans for an expedition were definite, and decisions by both Bouquet and Amherst came rapidly as reports of border incidents multiplied. On June 18 Amherst released another company to Bouquet, sending a small detachment of Royal Artillery along with it. A few days later (June 23), by which time the Detroit rumors had been confirmed, he sent 360 men to join Bouquet's forces at Carlisle.

PENNSYLVANIA RAISES SOME TROOPS

Although they had asked for aid from Pennsylvania, neither Bouquet, nor Amherst, nor Governor James Hamilton, himself, was optimistic about receiving it. In early June there were only 30 men actively defending Pennsylvania; they were stationed at Fort Augusta and were maintained by the proprietors rather than by the Provincial Assembly. On June 11, 100 men were authorized to serve at Fort Augusta. Though a welcome addition, these troops were not nearly enough to secure the frontier. The Governor did all he could within his own limited powers and resources. At a meeting of the Provincial Council on June 20, he presented various letters from the frontier giving evidence of Indian unrest and the hostile behavior of the Indians on the upper Susquehanna. Troubles with Indians in the Wyoming Valley were at that time more pressing than the problems in the west. By July 4, however, Governor Hamilton felt compelled to call the Provincial Assembly and to advise them of a general Indian uprising and the set-


tlers' abandonment of their homesteads. Amherst's request for troops to defend and protect the frontier was endorsed.

Two days later, on hearing of the loss of Forts Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango, the Assembly acted, to a certain extent. By July 8 a bill had been passed and signed authorizing the recruiting of 700 additional troops to protect lands purchased from the Indians east of the Alleghenies. These troops were promptly enlisted, and they, added to the existing troops, made it possible to garrison 400 men west of the Susquehanna River. By this time, however, it was too late for the troops to reach Bouquet and his expedition; at any rate, they could only have been used as far west as Bedford, beyond which the purchased land ended.

Meanwhile, Amherst, faced with the necessity of dividing his meager reserves between Detroit and Fort Pitt, informed Bouquet that he could send no more troops for the expedition.

BOUQUET PRESSES FORWARD

Bouquet proceeded with the preparations. Two days after the companies originally dispatched by Amherst arrived at the staging area of Carlisle (June 28), he ordered thirty of the fittest of these men to reinforce Fort Ligonier. Shortly thereafter, the remainder of the




Route of march of Colonel Bouquet

two companies which Amherst first released from the Highland infantry regiments on June 12 was sent to Fort Bedford. The third company, which Amherst sent on June 18, was dispatched to Fort Loudoun as a guard for cattle and horses.

The final troops from New York arrived on July 10. They left much to be desired, as many were malaria convalescents from recent West Indian fighting, and few had had any experience in wilderness fighting.

Finally, after supplies and transport had been gathered, the expedition was able to leave Carlisle on July 18. Winter storms and spring rains had washed out bridges and in general had made difficult the route to the west. Bouquet did not reach Bedford until the 25th, when a short stop was necessary to rest men and horses, repair wagons, and recruit scouts. Bouquet's men, being unfamiliar with wilderness fighting, could not be used as flankers. No sooner had he sent one out, Bouquet complained, than he had lost a man. Recruiting of thirty woodsmen was ordered; it is known that at least fourteen such men were obtained from Fort Cumberland under the command of Captain Lemuel Barrett.

Leaving Fort Bedford on July 26, the little army and its convoy of food pushed slowly on to Fort Ligonier, entering the welcome protection of the fort on August 2. The quiet was ominous, as was the absence of any news from Fort Pitt since Ecuyer's letter of June 26.



Bouquet's men to Fort Pitt, 1763

ALARM AT FORT PITT

Ecuyer's situation had grown steadily more depressing. He had learned of Shawnee participation in the uprising and had concluded that Fort Pitt would be the chief object of their attack. The Delawares solicitously urged Ecuyer to send his women and children to a safer place. Ecuyer stood firm, informing Turtle Heart and his Delawares that three armies with 6,000 men were approaching Fort Pitt, and that the British had food and ammunition to withstand any Indian attack.

On July 26 and 27 had come a major conference with Delaware and Shawnee chiefs, who again urged Ecuyer to withdraw. But again he declined, asserting the imminence of British attack. The Indians decided now that the time had come to end the war of nerves and begin the assault in earnest.

On the afternoon of July 28, the Indians began an attack which was to continue for four days and nights. Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and Mingoes displayed considerable daring as they came to the very edge of the river banks. Seven people in the fort were killed and Ecuyer, himself, was wounded in the leg.

The roofs of some of the buildings in the fort were damaged, although luckily most of the nighttime arrows fell short. Casualties were light for a battle as sustained as this. Enemy losses—estimated but not verified—were twenty killed and wounded from an attack force judged to be in excess of 400.

On the afternoon of August 1, the Indians suddenly ceased their attack, much to the relief—and puzzlement—of the exhausted Fort Pitt defenders. They were unaware that Bouquet, as he approached Ligonier, provided the Indians with a more urgent and more vulnerable target. Surprise and an attack in the open might bring more success than the so far fruitless besieging of Fort Pitt.

BOUQUET'S FORCE MARCHES FROM FORT LIGONIER

After two days rest at Fort Ligonier to gather strength for the final section of the march, the expedition left on August 4. Taking a step which would soon acquire significance, the men transferred their flour from barrels to flour bags to be carried by pack horses. The wagons and some of the powder and provisions were left at Ligonier. Plans for the next day called for a rapid march to the Bushy Run way sta-

tion, halfway between Fort Ligonier and Fort Pitt; after a short halt at Bushy Run, the column would time its march to enter the Turtle Creek valley at dark to minimize the danger of ambush. Having avoided conflict with the Indians so far, Bouquet and his men were doubly aware of the danger on this final approach.

The resting place at Bushy Run was only a mile away when the advance guard felt the first blows of the Indian attack on August 5. Attempts made to drive the Indians away were of no avail; Bouquet reported later that no sooner had they dislodged the enemy from one position than he appeared in another equally advantageous spot. Soon Bouquet's forces were completely surrounded by Indians and were under fire both from the front and the rear. From one o'clock in the afternoon until nightfall, the battle continued; Bouquet's loss of men exceeded sixty killed or wounded.

Bouquet hastily wrote a report to Amherst that evening, fearing his losses that day might prevent him from completing the essential journey to Fort Pitt. With the death of men and horses, and the additional responsibility of caring for the wounded, the possibility of surviving another Indian attack in the morning seemed remote.

A "FORT" IS BUILT, THE BATTLE BEGINS

That night Bouquet organized his troops on the top of a hill which, as he described it, was "a comodious Piece of Ground, & just Spacious enough for our Purpose." The men were deployed behind the flour bags, which were piled in a circle to form a make-shift fortification and a protection for the wounded.

As expected, the Indians mounted a vicious attack the next morning, August 6, again disappearing from one spot only to appear in another. The men were exhausted not only from the previous day's fighting, but from their long march into the wilderness, and were further handicapped by their lack of water and their inability to reach it without weakening their circular defense.

Bouquet's men, although unused to wilderness fighting, earned the praise of their commander by the steadfast way in which they responded to his orders, giving him no fear that the battle would be lost through their lack of training. Their diminishing numbers and the growing number of wounded, however, led him to the inescapable conclusion that some maneuver must quickly be devised so that he, rather than the Indians, could gain the advantage.

PLAN OF THE BATTLE NEAR BUSHY-RUN,
Gained by Colonel Bouquet, over the
 Delawares, Shawanese, Mingoes, Wyandots, Mohikons, Miamies, & Ottawas;
on the 5th and 6th of August 1763.
Surveyed by Tho^s Hutchins, Assistant Engineer.




REFERENCES.

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Grenadiers | 7. Entrenchment of Bags |
| 2. Light Infantry | for the Wounded. |
| 3. Battalion Men | x. The Enemy |
| 4. Rangers | 8. First Position of the Troops |
| 5. Cattle | oo Graves |
| 6. Horses | |

The plan of battle as sketched by Thomas Hutchins and first published in Philadelphia in 1765.

SITE OF THE BATTLE OF BUSHY RUN



Portions of two topographic maps (left, Irwin, 1953; right, Greensburg, 1954) published by the United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, show the contours of the battle site. Features shown on Hutchins' map, opposite page, may be noted here, in particular the site of the first day's engagement, August 5, at the hill marked 1207, and the site of the second battle, August 6, on the hill on the right of the map marked "Battlefield."

SURPRISE, THE KEY TO VICTORY

Bouquet formed an ingenious plan to fool the Indians into thinking that part of the line had bolted and to thus draw them into that part of the circle. The men who had feigned retreat would then surround and attack the Indians. The plan worked perfectly; the Indians rushed into the weakened line and were quickly routed by the very men who had "retreated". Having no time even to reload, the Indians were thoroughly dispersed and chased back into the forest for two miles.

There was little time for rejoicing. Bouquet's men made litters for the wounded, destroyed the part of the supplies which loss of horses made it impossible to transport, and made their way to Fort Pitt. The Indians attempted a small skirmish later that night, but were quickly driven off, and Bouquet arrived at the fort without further battle. The slow pace, however, delayed entry into the fort until the afternoon of the 10th. He could not even spare a man to carry the news of victory to Fort Pitt until that morning.

On arriving at Fort Pitt, Bouquet immediately reported to his superiors, to Pennsylvania officials, and to military friends. A personal messenger was sent to report first-hand details to Amherst. Women and children were escorted under military guard to Fort Ligonier, from there to be sent back east. The escort returned from Ligonier with supplies. Plans were made for the future security of Fort Pitt and its companion forts by a link-up with Detroit.

Always the military man, Bouquet began urging an attack on the Indians in their homelands as the only way to assure a peaceful frontier. A shortage of troops and supplies made a punitive expedition impracticable in the remaining months of 1763, but Bouquet did lead an attacking force the following year. The immediate danger, however, was removed, the Indians having scattered to their homes.

Bouquet hoped that his relief expedition would draw some of the Indians' attention away from the settlers, and this hope was partially realized. Provincial troops also aided in securing the valleys. Nonetheless, the damage wreaked by Indians was considerable. The Reverend William Thomson, a circuit rider, estimated that 1,500 plantations were evacuated. George Croghan, trader and Indian agent, estimated that in four months time the Indians killed or captured 2,000 persons. Colonel John Armstrong, commander of Provincial troops west of the Susquehanna River, reported forty-eight or forty-nine inhabitants killed east of the Allegheny hills. Bouquet thought that in a short time 600 persons were lost.

BOUQUET'S ACHIEVEMENT

Fortunately, Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run stopped the Indian depredations and made it possible for many settlers to return to their homes and salvage their crops. But the damage to a way of life was not quickly repaired. Not until Bouquet's expedition into central Ohio in 1764 to punish the Indians did the settlers return to their homes in any great numbers.

The British victory at Bushy Run, in a situation which had heretofore meant defeat, was due largely to Bouquet's military ability. He knew conventional European warfare, but was able to adapt his textbook tactics to conditions of wilderness conflict. He anticipated what might happen and planned for it. He understood the capabilities and limitations of the Indians. Above all, he was gifted with that intangible quality called leadership; from this leadership came good discipline and high morale.

On his march to relieve Fort Pitt, Bouquet realized that an engagement with the Indians was likely and organized his expedition accordingly. When a need for rangers became apparent, he obtained them. On his final march from Fort Ligonier he concentrated on security and maneuverability. During the battle his organization of an effective perimeter defense indicated an excellent command structure and prior staff work. The feigned withdrawal to bring the enemy into the open was executed with precision.

Through Bouquet's victory, Fort Pitt was relieved and a serious setback given the Indian uprising. Losing the battle would have meant abandoning Fort Pitt, and with it control of the Ohio lands. A full year would have been required to raise a new conquering army—a project which His Majesty's government, in a period of military retrenchment, might have written off as too expensive. Even if Detroit had held firm, the thin Great Lakes communication line would have been an uneasy one. Traders would have ventured forth, but not colonists. Any truce with the Indians would have been precarious.

Bushy Run was no small skirmish in the wilderness, from the standpoint of results achieved or even from the standpoint of troops involved in open encounter in that day and age. It was a major victory—a decisive battle—in quelling the 1763 Indian uprising.

BOUQUET'S DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE

Colonel Henry Bouquet wrote two letters to his superior, General Jeffery Amherst, describing the battle at Bushy Run. Published here are the texts of the manuscript letters received by Amherst, the first on October 23 and the second on October 26 (P.R.O., W.O. 34:40, ff. 322, 324). Texts of these have previously been published from drafts preserved by Bouquet among his own papers. These may be found in *The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet*, Series 21634, pp. 227-230, and Series 21653, pp. 207-211.

Camp at Edge Hill 26 miles from Fort Pitt

5th August 1763

Sir

The Second Instant the Troops and Convoy arrived at Ligonier where I could obtain no Intelligence of the Enemy, The Expresses sent Since the beginning of July, having been either killed or obliged to return, all the Passes being occupied by the Enemy. In this uncertainty I determined to leave all the Waggon's with the Powder, and a quantity of Stores and Provisions at Ligonier, and on the 4th proceeded with the Troops & about 340 Horses loaded with Flour.

I intended to have halted to Day at Bushy Run / a mile beyond this Camp/ and after having refreshed the Men and Horses, to have marched in the night over Turtle Creek, a very dangerous Defile of Several Miles, commanded by high and craggy Hills; But at one o'Clock this afternoon, after a March of 17 miles, the savages suddenly attacked our advanced guard, which was immediately supported by the two light Infantry Companies of the 42^d Regiment, who drove the Enemy from their Ambuscade, & pursued them a good Way. The savages returned to the attack and the Fire being obstinate on our Front and extending along our Flanks, we made a general Charge with the whole Line to dislodge the savages from the Heights, in which attempt we succeeded, without obtaining by it any decisive advantage, for as soon as they were driven from one Post, they appeared on another, till by continual Reinforcements, they were at last able to surround us, & attacked the Convoy left in our Rear: This obliged us to march back to protect it; The Action then became general, and though we were attacked on every Side, and the Savages exerted themselves with uncommon Resolution, they were constantly repulsed with Loss. We also Suffered considerably, Capt Lieut. Graham, and Lieut. James McIntosh of the 42^d are killed, & Capt. Graham wounded.

Of the R.A.R. Lieut. Dow who acted as A.D.Q.M.G. is shot through the body. Of the 77th Lieut. Donald Campbell, and Mr. Peebles, a Volunteer, are wounded.

Our Loss in Men including Rangers and Drivers exceeds Sixty killed or Wounded.

The action has lasted from one o'Clock till Night, and we expect to begin again at Daybreak.

Whatever our Fate may be, I thought it necessary to give your Excellency this early Information, that you may, at all Events, take such Measures as you will think proper with the Provinces for their own Safety, and the Effectual relief of Fort Pitt, as in case of another Engagement, I fear insurmountable [*sic*] difficulties in protecting & transporting our Provisions; being already So much weakened by the Losses of this Day in Men, and Horses, besides the additional Necessity of carrying the wounded, whose situation is truly deplorable.

I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the constant assistance I have received from Major Campbell during this long action, nor Express my admiration of the cool and steady behaviour of the Troops, who did not fire a Shot without orders, and drove the Enemy from their Posts with fixed Bayonets: The Conduct of the officers is much above my Praises.

I have the honor to be with great Respect

Sir

Your most obedient &

most Humble servant

Henry Bouquet

Camp at Bushy Run 6th August 1763

Sir

I had the honour to inform your Excellency in my Letter of yesterday of our first Engagement wth the Savages.

We took Post last night on the Hill where our Convoy halted when the Front was attacked / a comodious Piece of ground, & just Spacious enough for our Purpose/ There we encircled the whole & covered our wounded with the Flour Bags.

In the morning the Savages Surrounded our Camp, at the distance of about 500 yards, & by Shouting and yelping quite round that extensive Circumference thought to have terrified us with their Numbers: They attacked us early, and under Favour of an incessant Fire, made Several bold Efforts to penetrate our Camp, and tho' they failed in

the attempt, our Situation was not the less perplexing, having experienced that brisk attacks had little Effect upon an Enemy who always gave way when pressed, and appeared again immediately. Our Troops were besides extremely fatigued with the long march, and as long action of the preceding Day, and distressed to the last Degree by a total want of Water, much more intolerable than the Enemy's Fire.

Tied to our Convoy we could not lose Sight of it without exposing it & our wounded to fall a Prey to the Savages, who pressed upon us on every Side; and to move it was impracticable, having lost many Horses, and most of the Drivers Stupified by Fear, hid themselves in the Bushes, or were incapable of hearing or obeying any Orders.

The Savages growing every moment more audacious it was thought proper Still to increase their Confidence; by that means, if possible, to intice them to come close upon us, or to Stand their ground when attacked. With this View two Companies of Light Infantry were ordered within the Circle, & the Troops on their right and left opened their Files and filled up the Space: that it might Seem they were intended to cover the Retreat. The third Light Infantry Company, and the Grenadiers of the 42^d were ordered to Support the two first Companies. This manoeuvre Succeeded to our Wish, for the few Troops who took Possession of the ground lately occupied by the two Light Infantry Companies, being brought in nearer to the Center of the Circle, The Barbarians mistaking these motions for a Retreat hurried headlong on, and advancing upon us with the most daring intrepidity galled us excessively with their heavy Fire; but at the very moment that certain of Success, they thought themselves Masters of the Camp, Major Campbell at the head of the two first Companies Sallied out, from a Part of the Hill they could not observe, and fell upon their right Flank. They resolutely returned the Fire, but could not Stand the irresistible Shock of our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them, and put the rest to Flight. The Orders Sent to the other two Companies were delivered So timely by Captain Basset, & executed with such celerity and Spirit that the routed Savages, who happened to run that moment before their Front, received their full Fire, when uncovered by the Trees. The four Companies did not give them time to load a Second time, nor even to look behind them, but pursued them till they were totally dispersed. The left of the Savages, which had not been attacked, were kept in awe by the Remains of our Troops posted on the Brow of the Hill for that Purpose; nor durst they attempt to support, or assist their Right, but being witness to their Defeat, followed their Example and fled.

Our brave Men disdained so much to touch the dead Body of a vanquished Enemy that scarce a Scalp was taken, except by the Rangers & Pack Horse Drivers.

The Woods being now cleared and the Pursuit over, the four Companies took Possession of a Hill in our Front, and as soon as Litters could be made for the wounded, and the Flour and every thing destroyed, which for want of Horses could not be carried, we marched without molestation to this Camp. After the Severe Correction we had given the Savages a few hours before, it was natural to Suppose we Should enjoy Some Rest; but we had hardly fixed our Camp when they fired upon us again: This was very Provoking! However the Light Infantry dispersed them before they could receive Orders for that Purpose. I hope we Shall be no more disturbed, for if we have another Action, we Shall hardly be able to carry our wounded.

The behaviour of the Troops on this Occasion Speaks for itself So Strongly, that for me to attempt their Eulogium would but detract from their merit.

I have the honor to be most respectfully

Sir

Your most obedient

& most Humble Servant

Henry Bouquet

P.S. I have the honor to
Enclose the Return of the
killed, Wounded, and missing
in the two Engagements

H. B.

SUGGESTED READING

The reader may be prompted to study this subject further. A more detailed and annotated description of the Battle of Bushy Run by the present author is "Bushy Run: Decisive Battle in the Wilderness," *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, XLVI (July, 1963), 211-215. Henry I. Kurtz, "The Relief of Fort Pitt," *History Today*, XIII (November, 1963), 781-791, presents a vivid account.

There are several sources which give participants' views of these historic events. Conditions at Fort Pitt are described in Ecuyer's orderly book and in the journal of William Trent (incorrectly attributed to Ecuyer), which may be found in *Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier* (Pittsburgh, 1892). Trent's journal is also available in A. T. Volwiler, ed., "William Trent's Journal at Fort Pitt," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XI (December, 1924), 390-413. Colonel Bouquet's correspondence with Amherst, Blane, Ecuyer, and Ourry can be found in *The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1911-1913) series 21649, pt. 1, and series 21653.

The classic treatment of the Pontiac uprising is Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (New York: Collier Books, 1962). A treatment of the rebellion which utilizes the latest findings of historical research is Howard H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1917).

General works include Walter O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), a popular account of the history of forts at the site of what became Pittsburgh; and Alfred P. James and Charles M. Stotz, "Drums in the Forest," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, XLI (Autumn, 1958). The latter was also published as a book by the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, in 1958. James relates the history of Fort Duquesne through the time of the Forbes expedition, and Stotz examines the architecture of several frontier forts, including Fort Pitt.



